Both Cicero's and Macrobius' ideas about fortitude are cited in the most thorough and influential compendium of late mediaeval views about the four cardinal virtues, Guillemus Peraldus' Summa de Virtutibus (c. 1248). Peraldus also quotes the definition of constancy from the Moralium Dogma: `Constancia est stabilitas animi firma et in proposito perseverans.' 10 A similar conception of fortitude is presented in the brief discussion of the cardinal virtues in the Summa Virtutum de Remediis Anime, Chaucer's source for the section of the Parson's Tale on the remedial virtues. Often included in manuscripts as a sequel to Peraldus' companion compendium on the vices, the Summa Virtutum or Postquam provides definitions of fortitude from Cicero and Augustine which demonstrate the former's influence on the latter. 11 This mediaeval conception of fortitude explains not only Chaucer's characterization of Constance, but also his inclusion of the repeated references to fortune in the Man of Law's Tale; indeed, the former entails the latter. Though Chaucer takes the story of Constance's suffering from Trivet, he realizes the philosophic implications of the chronicle's account. Those rapid changes from prosperity to adversity that Constance undergoes throughout the tale become, in Chaucer's version, dramatizations of the turning of fortune's wheel. Although the three sea voyages occur in Trivet, for example, Chaucer's addition of Constance's prayers before each one reveals her fortitude in the face of adversity and emphasizes the Boethian idea of the sea as an emblem of fortune's hazards. 12 In withstanding the uncertain conditions of the sea, Constance symbolically endures the vicissitudes of fortune and thus enacts the definition of fortitude in the Moralium Dogma Philosophorum: Fortitudo est virtus retundens impetus adversitatis.' 13 Given this mediaeval conception, it seems that Griselda, the heroine of the Clerk's Tale, is an even better exemplar of fortitude than Constance, for she withstands the temptations of prosperity as well as the sufferings of adversity. Throughout the Clerk's Tale Chaucer refers to Griselda's patience and he repeats Petrarch's moral praising her constancy during her trial. Undoubtedly, her steadfastness exemplifies one species of fortitude. However, in the case of Griselda, fortitude is not her predominant virtue, but the quality which makes possible her exercise of obedience in the face of her husband's severe tests. A study of Chaucer's revisions of his Latin and French sources shows that it is this latter virtue that is most enhanced by the changes he makes. Patience is only the necessary means for Griselda's extraordinary obedience, a virtue regarded in the Middle Ages as a species of justice.
Although several critics have commented upon Griselda's obedience, 14 none has recognized that it renders her an example of justice, because modern readers of The Canterbury Tales are unfamiliar with the mediaeval conception of this cardinal virtue. Moralists of the Middle Ages adopted Cicero's definition of justice from the De Officiis as that virtue 'in hominem societate tuenda tribuendoque suum cuique et rerum contractarum fide'. 15 Cicero repeats the same idea in De Inventione, where he writes: 'Iustitia est habitus animi communi utilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens dignitatem.' 16 Augustine and Macrobius both endorse Cicero's emphasis on distributive justice, and Abelard, Alain de Lille and Aquinas reiterate it later in the Middle Ages. 17 The correspondence between this cardinal virtue and Griselda's behaviour becomes most apparent in study of the species or parts of justice. Such investigation is complicated, though, by the fact that more schemes of division were proposed for this virtue than for any of the other three. 18 Despite variations in these accounts of the species of justice, however, all the auxiliary virtues involve rendering either to God or to fellow-humans whatever is their due. God's due is religion, which Cicero defines as `quae superioris cuiusdam naturae, quam divinam vocant, curam caerimoniamque affert'. 19 The other parts of justice govern human relationships; and of these, the ones relevant to the Clerk's Tale are Cicero's reverence (d'Auvergne's obedience to superiors) and pietas or duty rendered to country and kin, especially parents. 20 The discussion of the parts of justice most useful for understanding the Clerk's Tale is in Peraldus' Summa de Virtutibus. After reviewing the divisions made by Cicero, Macrobius, Guillaume de Conches and Guillaume d'Auvergne, Peraldus proposes a synthesis of all four based primarily on d'Auvergne's scheme. Using the term /atria 'worship' introduced by Peter Lombard, Peraldus first discusses religion. He cites Cicero's definition but expands the classical concept to include not only external acts such as prayers and sacrifices but also the heartfelt acknowledgement of God's sovereignty through faith, hope and charity. Peraldus continues to consider humankind's debt to God in his discussion of the obedience (Cicero's reverence) owed to superiors, including the Creator. By voluntary obedience to the precepts and mandates of superiors, an individual sacrifices his or her will. Through a dual definition of propria voluntas 'one's own will', Peraldus emphasizes that such obedience must be rendered to God as well as to human superiors:
Et notandum quod propria voluntas dupliciter accipitur: uno enim modo dicitur propria voluntas: voluntas quae non est Deo subiecta: & secundum hoc abnegatio propriae voluntatis sit, cum voluntas nostra divinae voluntati subijcitur. Alio vero modo dicitur propria voluntas: voluntas quae non est subiecta homine: & secundum hoc propria voluntas abnegatur in eo qui voto se obligans homini voluntatem suam subdit voluntati humanae ... 21 Justice thus requires obedience both to the Creator and to those fellow-creatures to whom one is obliged, especially by vows. Peraldus further identifies the human superiors who must be obeyed in his chapter on the parts of this virtue. After dividing obedience into reprehensible and commendable, he gives as examples of the latter type the natural obedience of children to their parents and the contractual obedience of wives to their husbands. However, Peraldus also warns against the reprehensible act which occurs when one follows a superior's command to do evil. Citing the authority of Gregory the Great, Bernard and Augustine, he insists that wrongdoing cannot be justified in the name of obedience. 22 Peraldus' discussion of these two parts of justice, religion and obedience (reverence), clarifies the resonance which the Clerk's Tale had for its mediaeval audiences. Petrarch's retelling of Boccaccio's narrative about a dutiful wife as a religious allegory seems less incongruous if we recognize that obedience both to husband and to God were regarded as species of justice by mediaeval moralists. And Chaucer's clever manipulation of the literal and figurative modes of his tale is less bewildering if we know the traditional distinction which Peraldus makes between reprehensible and commendable obedience. The first clue to Chaucer's interest in this issue of lawful obedience occurs in the Prologue to the Clerk's Tale. The Clerk consents to the Host's request for a tale with the dutiful response:
The Clerk's words not only foreshadow the many acts of compliance with another's will within the tale, but also raise the issue so crucial in modern attempts to interpret the actions of Walter and Griselda: to what extent is it just and reasonable to demand and to give obedience?
The paradigm of voluntary compliance to the will of another in the Clerk's Tale is Griselda. That she was already regarded as an example of obedience is clear from the title given to Petrarch's narrative, De Insigni Obedientia et Fide Uxoris. Nonetheless, Chaucer intensifies the theme of Griselda's voluntary submission by amplifying or adding to the Latin and French versions. As Severs shows, the motive for Chaucer's revisions in his characterization of Griselda 'is to heighten [her] humble obedience to the will of her lord and husband'. 24 As in his sources, Chaucer's Griselda places herself under a twofold obligation of justice to Walter. In agreeing to become his wife, she accepts not only the marital duty to obey her husband, but also Walter's requirement that she never complain against his demands (IV 35 1-7). Echoing Mary's response to Gabriel, Griselda says:
Thus Griselda twice pledges to conform her will to Walter's.
Throughout her trials, Chaucer augments the obedience of Griselda already so marked in his sources. For example, in the meeting with Walter preceding the seizure of her son, Chaucer adds to Griselda's profession of obedience what seems to be a cold-hearted statement of acquiescence to her husband's cruelty:
The final qualifying phrase, however, indicates that Griselda accedes only because of her double vow to Walter. In the next stanza, taken from the sources, she declares her self-abnegation.
Even when Walter renounces her to take another wife, Chaucer insists that although Griselda perceives his cruelty, she nonetheless reaffirms her vow to him (IV 85 z-6i). That Griselda can still love Walter despite her awareness of his harshness demonstrates, as Severs observes, that her obedience is not the submission of a stupid or spineless wife, but that of a sentient individual who nevertheless voluntarily submerges her will in that of another.² 5 While Chaucer had only to augment the evidence of Griselda's justice in his sources, he found it necessary to alter radically the tale assigned to the Physician to indicate Virginia's conformity to the mediaeval conception of another cardinal virtue, temperance. As several critics have already observed, Chaucer transforms the narratives of Livy and Jean de Meun, which concentrate on the lustful injustice of Appius and the uncompromising integrity of Virginius, into one emphasizing the pathetic innocence of Virginia. 26 Although sometimes amplifying hints from Le Roman de la Rose, Chaucer adds approximately 176 original lines, more than half of his tale. Unique to his version are the long description of Virginia, partially adapted from an unrelated section in Le Roman de la Rose (VI 9-71, 105-17); the admonition to governesses and parents (VI 72-104); the dramatization of Virginia's murder by her father (VI 207-5 3); and the Physician's moral (VI 277-86). Through all of these additions, Chaucer changes the meaning of the tale; he begins this transformation in the initial description by presenting Virginia as a paragon of temperance.
In relating his characterization of Virginia to the cardinal virtue of temperance, Chaucer found an effective solution to a difficult problem. The primary definition of temperance in the Middle Ages derives from Cicero's De Inventione: `Temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio.' 27 This concept of temperance as the rational restraint of illicit desires, especially carnal ones, is repeated by most of the mediaeval commentators on the four cardinal virtues, including such influential ones as Augustine, Macrobius, Guillaume de Conches, Aquinas and Peraldus. 28 As a poet, however, Chaucer faced special problems in delineating such resistance to illicit carnal desires, for how does an artist portray an inner quality evinced only by the lack of particular vices? 31 Throughout the Middle Ages these two groups of subdivisions were often combined; treatises modelled on Cicero's list frequently cited items from Macrobius and vice versa. 32 Furthermore, analyses of temperance often included discussions of virginity since it was considered a manifestation of this cardinal virtue. According to Peraldus, for example, virginity is a species of continence. 33 He amplifies the Ciceronian category by articulating six characteristics of virginity: sobriety, labour, humility, custody of the senses, modesty of conversation and avoidance of the occasion of sin. The inclusion of modesty and sobriety in two different lists and the similarity of continence and moderation reduce these eighteen subdivisions to fifteen. Well known throughout the Middle Ages, these subdivisions of temperance correlate closely with the specific virtues Chaucer assigns to Virginia (VI 39-71, 105 16).
Chaucer bases his initial description of Virginia's virtues on Macrobius' list, for Virginia clearly possesses eight of the nine parts of temperance. Making the transition between Nature's panygeric and the narrator's encomium, Chaucer begins by identifying Virginia's virtue as the primary cause of her praiseworthiness:
Chaucer's statement attributes to Virginia an essential mark of temperance, Macrobius' honestas or sense of honour. As Aquinas observes, honestas is best defined as worth or virtue deserving honour; quoting Isidore of Seville, he explains: Virginia's integrity renders her praiseworthy and indicates that she possesses the first Macrobian part of temperance, a sense of honour. Complementing this is her strong sense of shame (Macrobius' verecundia): `Shamefast she was in maydens shamefastnesse' (VI 5 5). Chaucer also refers to her abstinence (VI 45) and her sobriety (VI 58-6o), those aspects of temperance which regulate the pleasures of eating and drinking. The young girl's virginity attests two of Macrobius' other parts of temperance, chastity and purity: 'As wel in goost as body chast was she; / For which she floured in virginitee' (VI 43 -4).
In describing the heroine of the Physician's Tale, Chaucer follows the example of many mediaeval moral treatises by augmenting Macrobius' list with Cicero's. In addition to these six characteristics derived from the Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, Chaucer ascribes to Virginia the three Ciceronian qualities of temperance: continence, clemency and modesty. In attributing attemperaunce (VI 46) to Virginia, Chaucer seems to be influenced by Cicero's conception of continence not simply as an abstinence from sexual activity but, more generally, as selfrestraint. 35 In this sense Cicero's continence is synonymous with Macrobius' moderation, and Chaucer uses attemperaunce to indicate their similarity. Likewise, Chaucer probably derives Virginia's pacience (VI 46) from Cicero's dementia. Mediaeval moralists often interpreted dementia both as forbearance in anger (Cicero's interpretation) and as endurance of adversity. 36 Given Virginia's youth and humility, the latter sense is more suitable and 'patience' an apt translation of dementia.
Chaucer devotes half the lines in the encomium to a description of Virginia's modesty, an aspect of temperance articulated by both Cicero and Macrobius. He praises her humility (VI 45), her propriety of bearing and array (VI 47), her discreet speech (VI 48-5 4) and her efforts to avoid situations 'That been occasions of daliaunces' (VI 6i-6). After warning governesses and parents to keep close watch over young girls in their charge, Chaucer concludes by praising Virginia's custody of herself:
These kinds of behaviour, all manifestations of modesty, correspond to four of the aspects of temperance which Peraldus finds especially appropriate for virgins: humility, custody of senses, modesty of conversation and avoidance of the occasion of sin.
Peraldus' discussion of the six parts of virginity also explains the final puzzle in Chaucer's description of Virginia, the reference to her constancy and busyness. The second of these qualities correlates with Peraldus' labor, the means through which virgins must resist the temptations of idleness. As Chaucer puts it, Virginia is 'Constant in herte, and evere in bisynesse / To dryve hire out of ydel slogardye' (VI 56-7). In this context, Virginia's constancy, the only characteristic not yet accounted for, perhaps corresponds to Macrobius' frugality (parcitas). Through the influence of the Moralium Dogma Philosophorum, parcitas came to be defined in the later Middle Ages as `mensuram refectionis non excedere'. 37 It is possible that Chaucer decided to refer to such self-restraint as an inner state of frugality or constancy of desire which keeps the appetites and passions in check.
It must certainly be more than coincidental that Chaucer's encomium on Virginia so closely resembles the subdivisions of temperance derived from Cicero and Macrobius. The traditional nature of this material renders it improbable that scholars will agree on a specific source for VI 39 71 and 105-i6 of the Physician's Tale. More importantly, though, the similarity between the conventional subdivisions of temperance and Chaucer's description establishes that he added this encomium to emphasize Virginia's role as a paragon of temperance.
The last example of a heroine modelled after a cardinal virtue occurs in the second narrative which the pilgrim Chaucer tells, the Tale of Melibee. Ascertaining the poet's purpose in this tale, however, poses unique problems, because the Tale of Melibee is a close translation of its source, Renaud de Louens's adaptation of Albertano of Brescia's Liber Consolationis et Consilii. Chaucer thus leaves no clues to his intention except for the fact that he was satisfied to incorporate this tale into his collection virtually unrevised. Perhaps one of the reasons for his satisfaction was that Renaud's Livre de Mellibee et Prudence already appropriately develops the theme Chaucer wanted to present. While he had to revise the other moral tales to clarify the relationship between the female protagonist and the cardinal virtue which she manifests, the portrayal of Prudence in Renaud's redaction of the Liber Consolationis et Consilii is obviously based on mediaeval conceptions of this virtue. However, because Renaud (and Chaucer following him) omits chapters vi-ix, in which Albertano explicitly discusses the nature of prudence, modern readers of the Tale of Melibee do not always recognize how the definitions of this cardinal virtue inform the characterization of Melibee's wife.
Albertano exhibits remarkable ability in compiling and combining definitions of prudence from the three authorities which dominated Christian moral philosophy throughout the Middle Ages: Cicero, Macrobius and the Pseudo-Seneca, Martin of Braga. In chapter vi Albertano presents a definition of this virtue: `"Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum utrarumque discretio" cum electione boni et fuga mali.' 38 This definition combines Cicero's two most influential expositions of this cardinal virtue. Most often cited in the Middle Ages was his brief discussion in De Inventione which defined prudence and identified its parts. Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: Memoria, intellegentia, providentia.' 39 The second Ciceronian definition, whose influence steadily increased during the mediaeval period, derives from the more thorough and detailed analysis of the four cardinal virtues in De Officiis. In the summary at the end of Book i, Cicero distinguishes between philosophical knowledge, sapientia or sophia, and practical knowledge or prudentia. Wisdom `rerum est divinarum et humanarum scientia'; it is especially concerned with causes. By contrast, prudence 'est rerum expetendarum fugiendarumque scientia'. 40 This definition, unlike the one in De Inventione, ascribes to prudence not only the intellectual ability to discriminate but also the volitional disposition to seek or avoid good and evil.
In the late twelfth century the concepts of prudence as intellectual discrimination from De Inventione and as volitional disposition from De Offciis were combined by Alain de Lille, and it is this conflation of Cicero's two definitions that Albertano cites in chapter vi of the Liber Consolationis et Consilii. Except for his reversal of the two final prepositional phrases, Albertano's definition of prudence is an exact quotation of Alain's: 'Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum utrarumque discretio cum fuga mali et electione boni.' 42 These two Ciceronian conceptions explain Albertano's characterization of Prudence, especially as she contrasts with Boethius' Philosophia. In accord with Cicero's distinction between the two kinds of knowledge, Prudence's lessons are practical rather than abstract, moral rather than metaphysical. Boethius' Philosophia appropriately teaches her pupil about the nature of causation in order to help him withdraw from the realm of fortune. Albertano's Prudence, on the other hand, gives pragmatic advice and seeks to influence Melibeus' action in the world. Thus, in keeping with both Cicero's definitions, Prudence not only informs her husband about good and evil but also tries to persuade him to choose the former and avoid the latter; she guides both his mind and his will. 43 Although the Ciceronian tradition explains Prudence's role as Melibeus' teacher, another popular conception of this cardinal virtue accounts for the specific lessons Albertano ascribes to her. In providing her husband with the general principles for eliciting and evaluating counsel, this character conforms to the definition of prudence in the Formula Honestae Vitae. This sixthcentury treatise, attributed to Seneca and extant in over two hundred manuscripts from before 1500, was, according to Tuve, as important for the Middle Ages as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics was for the Renaissance. 44 The discussion of prudence in the Formula Honestae Vitae is eclectic, incorporating material from Cicero's De Inventione and De Officiis together with original ideas. Although Albertano cites the authority of the Formula on fifteen different occasions, his most important quotation of Pseudo-Seneca is the description of prudent behaviour: Prudentis enim proprium est consilia examinare, nec cito credulitate ad falsa prolabi.' 45 Obviously, the idea that the special province of this cardinal virtue is to evaluate counsel accounts for the topics of Prudence's discourse in the Tale of Melibee.
Judging by the nature of things rather than the opinions of others, Prudence demonstrates the moral discretion ascribed to the virtue she exemplifies in the De Inventione and the Formula Honestae Vitae. And advising her husband to flee evil and choose good, she enacts the volitional influence Cicero associates with prudentia in De Officiis. Because Albertano's Prudence already conforms so well to the mediaeval definitions of the cardinal virtue whose name she bears, Chaucer did not need to revise Renaud's Livre de Mellibee et Prudence to accord with the three other narratives about virtuous women.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Chaucer probably chose each of the four tales under consideration because the behaviour of its female protagonist suggests an affinity to one of the four cardinal virtues; he indisputably revised each tale, as necessary, to enhance this identification. However, in revealing how mediaeval conceptions of the cardinal virtues inform Chaucer's characterization of these good women, I do not wish to reduce poetry to philosophy. Despite their extraordinary manifestations of virtue, all these figures, except perhaps Prudence, remain literal characters rather than personifications. As others have noticed, Chaucer dramatizes the suffering of these virtuous women with a realism and pathos that force the reader to acknowledge the personal toll of their ordeals. 46 In each case, the poet has, in ways I cannot investigate in the limits of this article, put moral authority to the test of human experience. Recognizing the influence of moral philosophy on the narratives of the Man of Law, the Clerk, the Physician and Chaucer's pilgrim persona does not exhaust the meaning of these tales; rather, the unwarranted suffering of their four virtuous protagonists suggests that in these narratives Chaucer explores the tension between philosophy and literature as modes of understanding the human condition. NOTES I am grateful to the University of North Carolina at Greensboro for a research leave which enabled me to write the first version of this essay. 
